### Interpretation- the aff should have to defend a parametricization of their method

Violation- the aff only discusses issues with existing scholarship- their alternative only calls for community engagement with no explanation of what that means. They have no solvency advocate for communities being able to build solar panels- and IF THEY COULD that would just be the SQ because they would ALREADY BE BUILDING THEM.

Vote neg-

1.) Aff conditionality- absent defense of a specific advocacy the aff can shift their interpretation of their argument in every speech to dodge method criticisms, counter-methods and impact turns to their understanding of scholarship- a moving target affirmative makes all of their truth claims falsifiable, which replicates the form of hegemonic knowledge production they criticize

2.) Neg ground- no robust defense of an abstract method- all the best responses are in the context of particularized discussion- even if the aff is correct about the way that democracy scholarship works, how should we change it, who should we give aid to, what does that mean for policy? Those are questions the negative can contest- lack of clear point of contestation makes it impossible to be negative and undermines in-depth clash- it also means their aff isn’t subjected to rigorous scrutiny to determine if

### The aff will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract – we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Ignatieff 4—Prof of Human Rights @ Harvard

Michael, *Lesser Evils* p. 20-1

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is **relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases.** What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, **abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice.** Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

### AND, THE PERMUTATION WILL FAIL—THE HEGEMONIC DISCOURSE OF THE AFF’S REPRESENTATION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WILL OVERWHELM AND MARGINALIZE THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMY AND MATERIAL INEQUALITY

DALLMYAR 2002

[Fred, Dept. Gov’t and Int’l Studies @ Notre Dame, “Asian Values and Global Human Rights”, Philosophy East & West, v52n2]

The discussion of ‘‘Asian values’’ and their universal/particular status throws into relief the broader question of the universality of rights in general. As one should note, Western liberal rights-discourse is challenged today not only from the Asian- Confucian side but also from the side of Islamic values and, more broadly, from the angle of traditional and indigenous cultures around the world. The situation is further complicated by claims advanced on the part of socially and economically disadvantaged or exploited groups sidelined by the advances of global capitalism and technology. In the literature on human rights, it is customary to distinguish between three ‘‘generations’’ of rights: first, civil and political rights (anchored in modern Western individualism); next, social and economic rights (sponsored chiefly by socialist movements); and finally, cultural and collective rights (championed mainly by non-Western and indigenous peoples). A basic question here concerns the interrelation of these different rights-claims. Paralleling the equation of Asian and universal rights, some commentators perceive an easy synthesis or symbiosis of the three generations patterned on familial harmony. Thus, commenting on the issue, Sumner Twiss remarks somewhat placidly that the ‘‘international human rights community’’ recognizes and accepts ‘‘all three generations or types of human rights as important and interrelated and needing to be pursued in a constructive balance or harmony.’’ Although in a given situation ‘‘one or another generation may merit special emphasis,’’ there is no possible dilemma because the three generations are ‘‘indivisible.’’15 Despite its emotive appeal or attractiveness, this vision of harmony stands in need of corrective criticism. As in the confrontation between ‘‘Asian values’’ and Western universality, the three generations of rights are not simply variations on one common denominator (‘‘human rights’’) but should be seen again as distinct ‘‘concept clusters’’ that, although partially overlapping, are embroiled in critical dialogue and mutual contestation. Thus, the cluster of civil and political rights is not simply continuous or smoothly compatible with the cluster of social and economic rights— as is demonstrated by the hegemonic position of the former in Western human-rights discourse (especially after the so-called defeat of socialism/communism and the marginalization of the labor movement). In a similar, and even aggravated way, individual civil rights are often in conflict with the preservation of cultural and collective claims—as is evident in the havoc frequently wrought by individual and corporate property rights in non-Western ‘‘developing’’ societies and especially among indigenous peoples. On this score, the clusters of socioeconomic and of collective-cultural rights tendentially merge or coalesce in that both share the brunt of hegemonic global agendas. The conflictual character of modern rights-discourse is eloquently highlighted by Rosemont when he calls that discourse a ‘‘bill of worries.’’ In Rosemont’s account, there is no smooth way of simply ‘‘extending’’ individual rights into the social and economic domain, because the realization of ‘‘second generation’’ rights (such as adequate housing and health care) typically requires a curtailment of ‘‘first generation’’ rights (chiefly private property). Hence, belief in a ready-made synthesis of rights-claims is ‘‘more an article of faith’’ than based on plausible arguments. Worries further intensify once attention is shifted to ‘‘third generation’’ rights, that is, to the defense of cultures, indigenous peoples, and ecological resources (where the very concept of ‘‘rights’’ becomes dubious or problematic). In light of the troubles afflicting Western society (and its hegemonic discourse), Rosemont recommends caution and critical contestation. Given prevailing social and existential dilemmas, he writes, how can Americans justify insisting—by diplomatic, military, economic, or other means— that every other society adopt the moral and political vocabulary of rights? . . . The questions become painful to contemplate when we face the reality that the United States is the wealthiest society in the world, yet after over two hundred years of human-rights talk, many of its citizens have no shelter, a fifth of them have no access to health care, a fourth of its children are growing up in poverty, and the richest two percent of its peoples own and control over fifty percent of its wealth.16

### Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations- capitalism racializes subjects to entrench competition and destroy universal consciousness. All of this is used to maintain the capitalist system of domination.

san juan 2003

[E., Fulbright Lecturer at Univ of Leuven, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation”, p. online]

It seems obvious that racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. Class exploitation cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the condition of possibility for it. It is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination. 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens. Third, the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.

### THEORIZING THE ROOT OF RACISM AS A FEAR OF DIFFERENCE MYSTIFIES THE MATERIAL NATURE OF EXPLOITATION, SUCCESSFULLY SUPRESSING ECONOMICS FROM THE POLITICAL HORIZON

young 2006

[Robert, Prof Critical Studies at Oxford, “Putting Materialism Back into Race Theory”, Red Critique, Spring 2006, p. online]

I foreground my (materialist) understanding of race as a way to contest contemporary accounts of race, which erase any determinate connection to economics. For instance, humanism and poststructuralism represent two dominant views on race in the contemporary academy. Even though they articulate very different theoretical positions, they produce similar ideological effects: the suppression of economics. They collude in redirecting attention away from the logic of capitalist exploitation and point us to the cultural questions of sameness (humanism) or difference (poststructuralism). In developing my project, I critique the ideological assumptions of some exemplary instances of humanist and poststructuralist accounts of race, especially those accounts that also attempt to displace Marxism, and, in doing so, I foreground the historically determinate link between race and exploitation. It is this link that forms the core of what I am calling a transformative theory of race. The transformation of race from a sign of exploitation to one of democratic multiculturalism, ultimately, requires the transformation of capitalism.

# Alternative

### BECAUSE RACISM IS DIALECTICALLY CONJOINED WITH THE EXPLOITATIVE LOGIC OF CAPITALISM, ONLY THE TOTALIZING METHOD OF CLASS POLITICS CAN OFFER THE WAY OUT—THEIR METHOD LOCALIZES AND DIVORCES THE PROBLEM, ALLOWING THE SYSTEM TO BUY-OFF GROUPS THROUGH REFORMISM, DESTROYING THE RADICAL POTENTIAL OF THE AFF\*\*\*

young 2006

[Robert, Prof Critical Studies at Oxford, “Putting Materialism Back into Race Theory”, Red Critique, Spring 2006, p. online]

This essay advances a materialist theory of race. In my view, race oppression dialectically intersects with the exploitative logic of advanced capitalism, a regime which deploys race in the interest of surplus accumulation. Thus, race operates at the (economic) base and therefore produces cultural and ideological effects at the superstructure; in turn, these effects—in very historically specific way—interact with and ideologically justify the operations at the economic base [1]. In a sense then, race encodes the totality of contemporary capitalist social relations, which is why race cuts across a range of seemingly disparate social sites in contemporary US society. For instance, one can mark race difference and its discriminatory effects in such diverse sites as health care, housing/real estate, education, law, job market, and many other social sites. However, unlike many commentators who engage race matters, I do not isolate these social sites and view race as a local problem, which would lead to reformist measures along the lines of either legal reform or a cultural-ideological battle to win the hearts and minds of people and thus keep the existing socio-economic arrangements intact; instead, I foreground the relationality of these sites within the exchange mechanism of multinational capitalism. Consequently, I believe, the eradication of race oppression also requires a totalizing political project: the transformation of existing capitalism—a system which produces difference (the racial/gender division of labor) and accompanying ideological narratives that justify the resulting social inequality. Hence, my project articulates a transformative theory of race—a theory that reclaims revolutionary class politics in the interests of contributing toward a post-racist society. In other words, the transformation from actually existing capitalism into socialism constitutes the condition of possibility for a post-racist society—a society free from racial and all other forms of oppression. By freedom, I do not simply mean a legal or cultural articulation of individual rights as proposed by bourgeois race theorists. Instead, I theorize freedom as a material effect of emancipated economic forms.